Abstract Intuitionistic epistemic logic introduces an epistemic operator, which reflects the intended BHK semantics of intuitionism, to intuitionistic logic. The fundamental assumption concerning intuitionistic knowledge and belief is that it is the product of verification. The BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic has a precise formulation in the Logic of Proofs and its arithmetical semantics. We show here that this interpretation can be extended to the notion of verification upon which intuitionistic knowledge is based, thereby providing the systems of intuitionistic epistemic logic extended by an epistemic operator based on verification with an arithmetical semantics too.
Introduction
The intended semantics for intuitionistic logic is the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, which holds that a proposition is true if proved. The systems of intuitionistic epistemic logic, the IEL family introduced in [5] , extend intuitionistic logic with an epistemic operator and interpret it in a manner reflecting the BHK semantics. The fundamental assumption concerning knowledge interpreted intuitionistically is that knowledge is the product of verification, where a verification is understood to be a justification sufficient to warrant a claim to knowledge which is not necessarily a strict proof.
In [5] the notion of verification was treated intuitively. Here we show that verification can also be given an arithmetical interpretation, thereby showing that the notion of verification assumed in an intuitionistic interpretation of knowledge has an exact model. Following Gödel [11] it is well known that intuitionistic logic can be embedded into the classical modal logic S4 regarded as a provability logic. Artemov [2] formulated the Logic of Proofs, LP, and showed that S4 in turn can be interpreted in LP, and that LP has an arithmetical interpretation as a calculus of explicit proofs in Peano Arithmetic PA. 1 Accordingly this makes precise the BHK semantics for intuitionistic logic. Intuitionistic logic, then, can be regarded as an implicit logic of proofs, and its extension with an epistemic/verification operator in the systems IEL − and IEL (given in Section 2) can be regarded as logics of implicit proofs, verification and their interaction. This is of interest for a number of reasons. It shows that the notion of verification on which intuitionistic epistemic logic is based is coherent and can be made concrete, and does so in a manner consonant with the intended BHK interpretation of the epistemic operator. Further, given intuitionistic logic's importance in computer science as well as the need for a constructive theory of knowledge, finding a precise provability model for verification and intuitionistic epistemic logic (see Section 5) is well-motivated.
Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic
According to the BHK semantics a proposition, A, is true if there is a proof of it and false if the assumption that there is a proof of A yields a contradiction. This is extended to complex propositions by the following clauses:
-a proof of A ∧ B consists in a proof of A and a proof of B; -a proof of A ∨ B consists in giving either a proof of A or a proof of B; -a proof of A → B consists in a construction which given a proof of A returns a proof of B; -¬A is an abbreviation for A → ⊥, and ⊥ is a proposition that has no proof.
The salient property of verification-based justification, in the context of the BHK semantics, is that it follows from intuitionistic truth, hence
is valid on a BHK reading. Since any proof is a verification, the intuitionistic truth of a proposition yields that the proposition is verified. By similar reasoning the converse principle
is not valid on a BHK reading. A verification need not be, or yield a method for obtaining, a proof, hence does not guarantee the intuitionistic truth of a proposition. Reflection expresses the factivity of knowledge in a classical language, intuitionistically factivity is expressed by
The basic system of intuitionistic epistemic logic, incorporating minimal assumptions about the nature of verification, is the system IEL − . IEL − can be seen as the system formalising intuitionistic belief. 
It is consistent with IEL − that false propositions can be verified. It is desirable, however, that false propositions not be verifiable; to be a logic of knowledge the logic should reflect the truth condition on knowledge, i.e. factivity -that it is not possible to know falsehoods. The system IEL incorporates the truth condition and hence can be viewed as an intuitionistic logic of knowledge.
Definition 2 (IEL). The list of axioms and rules for IEL are those for IEL
− with the additional axiom:
IE3.
KA → ¬¬A.
Given Axiom IE2 the idea that it is not possible to know a falsehood can be equivalently expressed by ¬K⊥. 2 For the following we will use this form of the truth condition in place of Axiom IE3.
Kripke models were defined for both systems, and soundness and completeness shown with respect to them, see [5] .
Embedding Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic into Classical Modal Logic of Verification
The well known Gödel translation yields a faithful embedding of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, IPC, into the classical modal logic S4. 3 By extending S4 with a verification modality V, the embedding can be extended to IEL − and IEL, and shown to remain faithful, see [14] . S4V − is the basic logic of provability and verification. 
A0.
The axioms of S4 for ✷.
As with IEL we add the further condition that verifications should be consistent.
Definition 4 (S4V). S4V is S4V
Kripke models for each system were outlined in [14] and the systems shown to be sound and complete with respect to them.
For IEL − and IEL their embedding into S4V − and S4V respectively, is faithful. For an IEL − or IEL formula F , tr(F ) is the translation of F according to the rule box every sub-formula into the language of S4V − or S4V respectively.
Theorem 1 (Embedding). The Gödel translation faithfully embeds IEL − and IEL into S4V
− and S4V, respectively:
Proof. See [14] .
Logics of explicit proofs and verification
Gödel [11] suggested that the modal logic S4 be considered as a provability calculus. This was given a precise interpretation by Artemov, see [2, 4] , who showed that explicit proofs in Peano Arithmetic, PA, was the model of provability which S4 described. The explicit counter-part of S4 is the Logic of Proofs LP in which each ✷ in S4 is replaced by a term denoting an explicit proof. Since intuitionistic logic embeds into S4 the intended BHK semantics for IPC as an implicit calculus of proofs is given an explicit formulation in LP, and hence an arithmetical semantics. Here we show that this arithmetical interpretation can be further extended to the Logic of Proofs augmented with a verification modality, providing S4V − and S4V, and therefore IEL − and IEL with an arithmetical semantics. Similarly to the foundational picture regarding the relation between IPC, S4 and LP (see [2] ) we have that
The basic system of explicit proofs and verifications LPV − is defined thus:
4 [14] presented a stronger version of S4V with ¬V⊥ instead of ¬✷V⊥. The weaker axiom presented here is sufficient for the embedding; one can readily check that the Gödel translation of ¬K⊥, ✷¬✷V✷⊥, is derivable in S4V as formulated here. The weaker axiom allows for a uniform arithmetical interpretation of verification. 
Definition 7 (LPV). The system LPV is LPV
E7. ¬t:V⊥
A constant specification, CS, is a set {c 1 :A 1 , c 2 :A 2 . . . } of formulas such that each A i is an axiom from the lists above, and each c i is a proof constant. This set is generated by each use of the constant necessitation rule in an LPV − or LPV proof. The axiom necessitation rule can be replaced with a 'ready made' constant specification which is added to LPV − or LPV as a set of extra axioms. For such a CS let LPV − -CS and LPV-CS mean LPV − and LPV, respectively, minus the axiom necessitation rule plus the members of CS as additional axioms.
A proof term, t, is called a ground term if it contains no proof variables, but is built only from proof constants and operations on those constants. LPV − and LPV are able to internalise their own proofs, that is if A 1 . . . A n , y 1 :B 1 . . . y n :B n ⊢ F then for some term p(x 1 . . . x n , y 1 . . . y n )
x 1 :A 1 . . . x n :A n , y 1 :B 1 . . . y n :B n ⊢ p(x 1 . . . x n , y 1 . . . y n ):F, see [2] . As a consequence LPV − and LPV have the constructive necessitation rule: for some ground proof term t,
This yields in turn:
Proof. Assume ⊢ A, then by constructive necessitation ⊢ t:A for some ground proof term t, hence by Axiom E6 ⊢ VA.
Note that the Deduction Theorem holds for both LPV − and LPV.
Arithmetical Interpretation of LPV − and LPV
We give an arithmetical interpretation of LPV − and LPV by specifying a translation of the formulas of LPV − and LPV into the language of Peano Arithmetic, PA. We assume that a coding of the syntax of PA is given. n denotes a natural number and n the corresponding numeral. F denotes the numeral of the Gödel number of a formula F . For readability we suppress the overline for numerals and corner quotes for the Gödel number of formulas, and trust that the appropriate number or numeral, as context requires, can be recovered. 6 
Definition 8 (Normal Proof Predicate).
A normal proof predicate is a provably ∆ formula Prf(x, y) such that for every arithmetical sentence F the following holds:
1. PA ⊢ F ⇔ for some n ∈ ω, Prf(n, F )
A proof proves only a finite number of things; i.e. for every k the set T (k) =
{l|Prf(k, l)} is finite. 
Proofs can be joined into longer proofs; i.e. for any k and l there is an n s.t. T (k) ∪ T (l) ⊆ T (n).

Example 1. An example of a numerical relation that satisfies the definition of
Prf(x, y) is the standard proof predicate Proof(x, y) the meaning of which is
"x is the Gödel number of a derivation of a formula with the Gödel number y".
Theorem 2. For every normal proof predicate Prf(x, y) there exist recursive functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x) such that for any arithmetical formulas F and G and all natural numbers k and n the following formulas hold:
Proof. See [2] .
Definition 9 (Verification Predicate for LPV − ).
A verification predicate is a provably Σ formula Ver(x) satisfying the following properties, for arithmetical formulas F and G:
These are properties which a natural notion of verification satisfies. Let Bew(x) be the standard provability predicate, 8 and Con(PA) be the statement which expresses that PA is consistent, i.e. ¬Bew(⊥). ¬Con(PA) correspondingly is Bew(⊥).
Example 2. The following are examples of a verification predicate Ver(x):
1. "Provability in PA", i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(x); for a formula F Ver(F ) is ∃xPrf(x, F ). 2. "Provability in PA + Con(PA)" i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(Con(PA) → x); one example of a formula for which Ver(x) holds in this sense is just the formula Con(PA). Such verification is capable of verifying propositions not provable in PA. 3. "Provability in PA + ¬Con(PA)" i.e. Ver(x) = Bew(¬Con(PA) → x); an example of a verifiable formula which is not provable in PA, is the formula ¬Con(PA). Such verification is capable of verifying false propositions. 4. ⊤, i.e. Ver(x) = ⊤; that is for any formula F Ver(F ) = ⊤, hence any F is verified.
Proof. Assume PA ⊢ F , then by Definition 8 there is an n such that Prf(n, F ) is true, hence PA ⊢ Prf(n, F ), and by Definition 9 part 2 PA ⊢ Ver(F ).
We now define an interpretation of the language of LPV − into the language of Peano Arithmetic. An arithmetical interpretation takes a formula of LPV − and returns a formula of Peano Arithmetic; we show the soundness of such an interpretation, if F is valid in LPV − then for any arithmetical interpretation * F * is valid in PA. 8 With the standard multi-conclusion proof predicate in which a proof p is a proof of F if F occurs somewhere in p. 9 A corresponding completeness theorem is left for future work, as is the development of a system with explicit verification terms, in addition to proof terms, realising the verification modality of S4V − or S4V. 
An arithmetical interpretation is given inductively by the following clauses:
Let X be a set of LPV − formulas, then X * is the set of all F * 's such that F ∈ X. For a constant specification, CS, a CS-interpretation is an interpretation * such that all formulas from CS * are true. We give a sequent formulation of S4V − and S4V. We will denote the sequent formulations by S4V − g, S4Vg respectively. A sequent is a figure, Γ ⇒ ∆, in which Γ, ∆ are multi-sets of formulas.
Definition 12 (S4V
− g). The axioms for the system S4V − g are:
The structural and propositional rules are those of the system G1c from [15] . The modal rules are:
The system S4Vg is the system S4V − g with the additional axiom:
Weak Inconsistency Elimination
Soundness can be shown by induction on the rules of S4V − g and S4Vg. Completeness and cut-elimination can be shown in a manner similar to that of [3] . 10 
Realisation of S4V
− and S4V
Here we show that each ✷ in an S4V − or S4V theorem can be replaced with a proof term so that the result is a theorem of LPV − or LPV, and hence that IEL 
Proof. By induction on S4V − derivations. The forgetful projections of Axioms E1 to E4 and E6 are ✷(A → B) → (✷A → ✷B), ✷A → A, ✷A → ✷✷A, ✷A → ✷A and ✷A → VA respectively, which are all provable in S4V − . The forgetful projection of ¬t:V⊥ is ¬✷V⊥ which is provable in S4V. The rules are obvious. The informal reading of the S4 provability modality ✷ is existential, ✷F means 'there is a proof of F ' (as opposed to the Kripke semantic reading which is universal, i.e. 'F holds in all accessible states'), normal realisations are the ones which capture this existential meaning, see [2] .
Definition 15 (Realisation
). A realisation, F r , of an S4V − or S4V formula F is the result of substituting a proof term for each ✷ in F , such that if S4V − , S4V ⊢ F then LPV − , LPV ⊢ F r respectively.
Definition 16 (Polarity of Formulas). Occurrences of
The realisation theorem, Theorem 6, shows that if a formula F is a theorem of S4V
− then there is a substitution of proof terms for every ✷ occurring in F such that the result is a theorem of LPV − . This means that every ✷ in S4V − can be thought of as standing for a (possibly complex) proof term in LPV − , and hence, by Theorem 3, implicitly represents a specific proof in PA. The proof of the realisation theorem consists in a procedure by which such a proof term can be built, see [1, 2, 7, 10] . Given a (cut-free) proof in S4V − g we show how to assign proof terms to each of the ✷'s occurring in the S4V − g proof so that each sequent in the proof corresponds to a formula provable in LPV − ; this is done by constructing a Hilbert-style LPV − proof for the formula corresponding to each sequent, so as to yield the desired realisation.
Occurrences of ✷ in an S4V − g derivation can be divided up into families of related occurrences. Occurrences of ✷ are related if they occur in related formulas of premises and conclusions of rules. A family of related occurrences is given by the transitive closure of such a relation. A family is called essential if it contains at least one occurrence of ✷ which is introduced by the (⇒ ✷) rule. A family is called positive (respectively negative) if it consists of positive (respectively negative) occurrences of ✷. It is important to note that the rules of S4V − g preserve the polarities of ✷. Any ✷ introduced by (⇒ ✷) is positive, while ✷'s introduced by (✷ ⇒) and the interaction rule are negative.
Theorem 6 (S4V
− Realisation). If S4V − ⊢ F then LPV − ⊢ F r for some normal realisation r.
